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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities markets today constitute a truly transnational economic order. Both
issuers and investors routinely participate in capital markets outside their home
jurisdictions; broker-dealers, investment managers, and other market participants
frequently operate across geographic boundaries; and cross-border transactions
have reached a staggering daily volume. The legal order that regulates these markets,
however, operates predominantly at the national scale. The substantive norms
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governing securities markets are for the most part produced by individual states and
applied by domestic institutions. Moreover, while there may be consensus regarding
the general objectives of securities regulation (and regarding the challenges that the
transnationalization of markets creates), significant divergence persists across
regulatory systems regarding the content of those norms. The resulting gap between
the global scale of the markets and the domestic scale of regulation poses significant
challenges to regulators as well as market participants.
This paper is about the theory and practice of transnational legal ordering.1 It
seeks to gain insight into how transnational legal orders (TLOs) advance by
examining one particular problem: the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC)
derivative securities.2 It focuses on events following the global financial crisis, which
exposed the deficiencies of the existing regulatory order in identifying and
containing the risks created by trading in those securities.3 In the aftermath of the
crisis, the cross-border systemic risk created by OTC derivatives trading was
characterized as a problem of global dimension that necessitated a global response.
A wide array of actors and institutions, both domestic and international, mobilized
quickly to craft a legislative and regulatory response. Given the catastrophic nature
of the crisis, and the general manifestation of political will to address the problem,
one might have predicted the successful development and institutionalization of
shared norms regulating derivatives trading.4 That move, however, has been limited.
The paper begins by outlining the regulatory challenges resulting from the
globalization of securities markets and describing the evolution of the international
regulatory regime (Part II). It suggests that to the extent a transnational order has
emerged in that area, it is characterized not by substantive norms that have settled
across multiple national systems, but rather by conflicts norms guiding the
allocation of regulatory authority among national systems. Part III turns to the
actions of regulators in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It analyzes the
1. See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2014) (defining a transnational legal
order as “a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that
authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions”).
2.
Financial derivatives are instruments whose value is derived from some underlying
instrument, asset, or interest. They include instruments traded on securities exchanges (including
standardized futures and options contracts), as well as instruments traded over-the-counter (including
swaps and other privately negotiated contracts). See generally Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the
Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 212 n. 2 (1997) (providing a brief introduction to
derivatives). Prior to the recent reforms discussed infra, OTC transactions were not subject to the
reporting and margin requirements applicable to exchange-based trading in derivatives. In addition,
they were settled between the counterparties rather than through central clearinghouses, presenting the
risk of counterparty default. See Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the Need
for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473,
482-483 (2010) (outlining these characteristics of the OTC market).
3. See Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision:
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 246 (2010) (exploring reasons for the failure
of international institutions to prevent the crisis).
4.
As Halliday and Shaffer note, financial crises are among the types of “precipitating
conditions” that often catalyze the formation of TLOs. Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 35-36.
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rulemaking process in the United States and elsewhere, considering the various
actors and organizations involved in that process—from national regulatory
agencies to international standard-setting bodies to multinational regulatory
networks. This section investigates whether the financial crisis has precipitated the
implementation of shared substantive norms within multiple legal systems. It
concludes that it has not, and explores certain obstacles that have impeded the
development of an effective transnational legal order in this area. The paper
concludes with some observations about how the political economy of particular
regulatory regimes intersects with the theory of transnational legal ordering.
II. CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
With certain limited exceptions, the laws governing securities markets, market
participants such as broker-dealers, and individual transactions in securities are
enacted at the national level. Domestic regulatory systems around the world are at
different levels of maturity; for instance, while the United States adopted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme in the first half of the twentieth century, many
other countries have systems that are fewer than twenty years old.5 They also reflect
a variety of different philosophies regarding the purpose and extent of regulation.6
As a result, applicable norms on a range of issues—from the extent and type of
disclosure that issuers must provide to anti-fraud rules to registration requirements
for certain market participants—vary significantly from country to country.
The markets these laws regulate have become increasingly international. The
range of listing options available to issuers has expanded significantly, and many
issuers choose to list their securities on exchanges outside their home jurisdiction.7
Electronic trading has made it more practical for traders to invest in foreign
markets, facilitating capital mobility.8 The rise of multinational exchange groups is
also noteworthy, as such groups can use common trading platforms that enable the
trading of particular forms of cross-border securities.9 As a result of these and other
5.
See CALLY JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 10
(2014) (outlining the evolution of capital markets regulation and noting that many markets
“demonstrated surprising diversity and resistance to formal regulation”).
6. Id. at 4.
7. This is due partly to the creation of additional exchanges in emerging markets, but also to
the fact that the increased liquidity in smaller and regional markets has made more of them attractive
to issuers. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1435, 1464-67 (2008) [hereinafter Stock Exchanges] (describing the success of various markets in
competing with the historically largest markets, as well as the rise of regional financial hubs). Significant
numbers of issuers choose to list their securities on markets outside their home jurisdictions; the New
York Stock Exchange, for instance, currently lists almost 500 non-U.S. companies. NYSE Non-U.S.
Listed Company Directory, https://www.nyse.com/get-started/international/documents-reports.
8. Stock Exchanges, supra note 7, at 1460-61.
9. Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), for instance, is an American network of exchanges and
clearing houses for financial and commodity markets. ICE owns and operates eleven regulated
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange as well as futures exchanges in Canada, Europe
and Singapore. It also owns and operates two over-the-counter markets, along with six central clearing
houses, again including a number outside the United States. About Us, INTERCON. EXCH.,
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factors, international debt,10 equity,11 and, particularly, derivatives markets12 have
become vast.
The gap between the global scale of the markets and the domestic scale of
regulation poses significant challenges to the transnational economic order. Issuers
seeking to raise capital in more than one market confront “duplicative, inconsistent
and conflicting requirements which lead to significant compliance burdens and
unnecessary barriers to cross-border trading and investment.”13 The same is true of
market participants such as investment managers and brokers who are active in
multiple jurisdictions. Similarly, investors considering investments outside their
home markets face difficulties in accessing financial and other disclosure that would
permit cross-market comparison of investments, and bear increased transaction
costs. Of course, the gap in scale also creates significant challenges for domestic
regulators. The primary mandate of each regulator is to ensure the stability and
soundness of domestic markets and to protect domestic investors. But as markets
become more interconnected, and as issuers and investors participate in more
transactions outside their own jurisdiction, regulators routinely confront territorial
limits on their authority to reach actors and activity that affect their markets.14
https://www.intercontinentalexchange.com/about/overview (last visited Jul. 20, 2016). See also Stock
Exchanges, supra note 7, at 1460-61 (noting the possibility of devising new forms of securities that would
draw on global investor pools).
10. As of year-end 2015, there was over $20 trillion outstanding in international debt securities
(bonds issued in a market other than that of the issuer’s residence). Statistics, Summary of debt securities
outstanding, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, www.bis.org/statistics (last visited Jul. 20, 2016) (reporting
the figure as $21,121 billion).
11. In the United States, for instance, U.S. holdings of foreign equity securities at year-end 2014
amounted to over $6.5 trillion in market value. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
OF FOREIGN SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2014 4 (Jan. 2016), available at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx (reporting portfolio
investment of U.S. residents in equity securities issued by non-U.S. entities as $6.762 trillion as of that
date). Foreign holdings of equity securities issued by U.S. entities also exceeded $6 trillion. DEP’T OF
THE TREAS., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF JUNE 30, 2015 3 (May
2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx
(reporting foreign holdings in U.S. equity securities as $6.665 trillion as of that date).
12. As of the end of 2015, the total notional value of outstanding OTC derivatives contracts
was $493 trillion. Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-December 2015, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS 2, http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1605.htm (last visited July 3, 2016). The gross credit
exposure related to those derivatives was $2.9 trillion. Id. Importantly, the substantial majority of those
instruments are cross-border—in other words, the counterparty is located in a different country than
the dealer. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,976 (May 23, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (describing cross-border transactions as “the norm, not
the exception.”). The BIS reports that less than 24% of notional credit default swaps outstanding at
year-end 2015, for instance, were entered into with a counterparty based in the dealer’s home country.
Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics, at 5.
13. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO TASK FORCE ON CROSS-BORDER REGULATION
CONSULTATION REPORT 43 (2014) [hereinafter IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT].
14.
Specific regulatory challenges include how to regulate participants active in multiple
markets (e.g., licensing requirements for investment advisors; broker-dealer registration requirements;
reporting requirements for swaps dealers); how to facilitate cross-border securities settlement (trading
hours, clearance and settlement systems); and how to resolve differences in accounting and disclosure
requirements that affect issuers active in multiple markets as well as investors seeking to invest abroad.
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One might expect these forces to lead to greater convergence in the laws
governing securities markets. Importantly, however, the internationalization of
capital markets also creates the conditions for regulatory competition. States have
an interest not only in regulating their markets, but also in attracting capital.15
Lawmakers therefore face continuing tension between the need to strengthen
regulation in the cross-border sphere and the desire to maintain the competitiveness
of their markets.16 As a result, the steps taken toward transnational securities
regulation have been tentative, and divergence across regulatory regimes persists as
a feature of the regulatory system.
In recent decades, much has been made of the internationalization of securities
regulation. Significant efforts have been devoted to the development of harmonized
rules in certain areas, including financial reporting and issuer disclosure. On the
enforcement front, bilateral and multilateral agreements among regulatory agencies
have established a framework for cross-border cooperation. In addition, as explored
in the extensive literature on transgovernmentalism, transnational networks have
developed with a view to facilitating more effective regulation of the global
markets.17 And in certain areas, standard setting by private international bodies plays
a role in shaping market activity.18 The following section outlines these trends in the
regulation of capital markets.
A. Unilateral Action at the National Level
The primary regulatory response to the internationalization of securities
markets is the projection of domestic law beyond the borders of the regulating
state.19 In many substantive areas, legislatures and rule makers simply widened the
scope of local norms to reach particular actors, or particular transactions, even when
the activity in question was centered in a foreign country. The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, for instance, introduced a number of requirements relating to corporate
governance (including provisions relating to the constitution and function of audit
15. Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 47, 51-52 (1993) (pointing out that “[s]tates compete, like firms, for capital and other
economic factors”).
16. For a report highlighting this tension, see COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S.
CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007). The report
notes the need “to strike the right balance between two statutory mandates: protecting investors and
promoting capital formation.” Id. at 11.
17.
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) (accounts of transgovernmental networks
as a key development in international governance).
18. See infra Part II.C (discussing the role of private standard-setting bodies).
19. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND.
L.J. 1405, 1437-38 (2013) (identifying regulatory unilateralism as “the baseline,” and stating that
“[r]ather than systematically looking for cooperative solutions, [states] first attempt to address new
cross-border challenges by applying their own laws, even if the relevant activities also have connections
to other states.”).
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committees) that were applied even to foreign companies, as long as their securities
were publicly listed on U.S. exchanges.20 This law simply expanded the geographic
reach of U.S. securities law, imposing local norms on companies active within U.S.
markets. In Europe, too, regulators applied various financial requirements to foreign
companies whose activities affected their markets.21
Such maneuvers are often accompanied by pullbacks that exempt—either
entirely or almost entirely—foreign activity that has minimal effect in the regulating
country. In the United States, for example, the law requiring registration of securities
has extraterritorial scope, applying to offers and sales of securities that occur outside
the United States if they have a jurisdictional nexus within the country.22 Regulation
S, however, exempts from these registration requirements offshore offerings that
are structured to preclude U.S. investment.23 Similarly, a number of countries
provide exemptions from registration requirements for foreign broker-dealers
engaged in only limited activity within their borders.24
B. International Enforcement Cooperation
Other efforts have focused directly on the challenge of enforcing domestic
norms in the cross-border context. Beginning in the 1980s, securities regulators in
a number of countries developed bilateral memoranda of understanding supporting
mutual assistance and cooperation in the enforcement of national laws. Under these
agreements, regulators undertook to assist each other in various investigation and
enforcement functions such as evidence gathering.25 Second-generation agreements
of this type also provided for cooperation in supervisory functions.
Transnational networks of domestic regulators have developed to support
these efforts. The most prominent is the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO was formed in 1983 by securities regulators from
North and South America as an expansion of their inter-American regional
consortium. Regulators from other continents soon joined the organization, and it
created a permanent General Secretariat in 1986. The organization now includes
124 ordinary members (national securities commissions or similar entities with
authority over securities or derivatives markets), as well as 15 associate members
(supra- or sub-national governmental regulators and international organizations

20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
7201-7266).
21. Verdier, supra note 19, at 1438-39.
22.
15 U.S.C. § 77e prohibits the use of “any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails” to sell an unregistered security.
23. Offshore Offers and Sales, SEC Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (April 24, 1990), 55 Fed.
Reg. 18306 (May 2, 1990). See IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-13 (providing
additional examples of this sort of accommodation to foreign entities or transactions).
24. IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 12.
25.
See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and
Functionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation¸4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
69, 86-87 (1994) (describing this form of agreement).
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with an interest in securities regulation).26 Other securities-specific network
organizations include regional bodies such as the Asia Securities Forum, the Council
of Securities Regulators of the Americas, and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators. Securities regulators also maintain official “dialogues” with each other
whose goals include identifying regulatory risks, strengthening cooperation, and
enhancing technical assistance efforts.27
Overall, the general consensus is that the level of cooperation among securities
regulators is high, and that these instruments have helped to resolve some of the
challenges—with respect both to enforcement and to supervision of market
participants—posed by the transnationalization of the securities markets. One of
the greatest success stories is practice under the Multilateral Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of
Information (MMoU) developed by IOSCO in 2002. The MMoU establishes
requirements regarding “how [members] should consult, cooperate, and exchange
information for the purpose of regulatory enforcement regarding securities
markets.” It now has over 100 signatories. IOSCO reports high utilization of the
information sharing mechanism established in the MMoU, with requests increasing
from 56 in 2003 (shortly after its adoption) to 3,203 in 2015.28
C. Standard Setting at the National and International Levels
During the period in which investment activity was concentrated in a few
markets, regulators in those markets were able to insist that foreign participants
comply with their rules or lose market access.29 As a result, standard setting in the
area of securities regulation was conducted primarily through the export of local
norms by dominant market regulators.30 Regulators in established markets also
regularly provided technical assistance to regulators in developing markets, with the
aim of elevating the level of regulation.31 These programs were often conducted
within the framework of bilateral memoranda of understanding between particular
agencies.

26. About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection
=about_iosco (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
27.
Office of International Affairs, International Regulatory Policy, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
www.sec.gov/oia (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
28. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange
of Information (MMoU), INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/about
/?subsection=mmou (last visited Jul. 20, 2016) (showing MMoU Information Requests).
29. See David Bach, Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global Governance, 36
REV. INT’L STUDIES 561, 576-77 (2010).
30. See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelley, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation,
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 886 (2009); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case
of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001).
31. See Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical Assistance Program, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (describing the SEC’s work
with over 100 countries).
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As capital market activity became more dispersed, the ability of individual
historically strong financial centers (including the United States) to insist on
compliance with their own particular regulations was compromised.32 Increasingly,
the work of standard setting has shifted to the transnational plane, where it is
conducted primarily by international organizations.33 This is not to say that
dominant market regulators do not exert significant influence over the content of
the relevant standards34—but the process has become a more multilateral one. The
preeminent securities organization involved in this work is IOSCO, whose mission
statement includes the goal to be “the global standard setter for the securities
sector.”35
In 1998, IOSCO published its “Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation.”36 This document, as revised most recently in 2010, sets forth three
objectives of securities regulation: protecting investors; ensuring that markets are
fair, efficient and transparent; and reducing systemic risk.37 From these objectives
38 principles are derived. These principles operate at a high level—for instance,
they include the principles that the regulator should be “operationally independent
and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers,”38 that investors should
have access to timely and accurate disclosure from issuers,39 and that “there should
be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems which should
aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable
rules…”40 While consensus on the fundamental objectives and scope of effective
securities regulation is fairly broad, implementation remains a struggle. The fact that
these principles were adopted by an organization whose membership includes
securities regulators from over 100 different jurisdictions—most of them
representing emerging markets—is itself some evidence of broad acceptance of
these goals.41 Implementation of the relevant principles, however, varies across

32.
See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 328 (2010)
(noting that U.S. regulators must address “how to export [their] preferred safeguards and reforms in a
time of declining U.S. economic and financial influence.”).
33.
See Karmel & Kelley, supra note 30, at 886 (“In a world where there is no economic
hegemony by any one country, it is necessary for all of the major players in the global capital markets
to agree upon the regulation of these markets. The development of standards through soft law is
probably the only realistic method of doing so.”).
34. See Verdier, supra note 19, at 1443 (noting that the “great powers. . . are in a strong position
to shape the international standards.”).
35. About IOSCO, supra note 26.
36.
See JORDAN, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing the history of this document) and at 46-47
(discussing the most recent version).
37. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS 3 (2010), https
://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf.
38. Id. at 4 (Principle 2).
39. Id. at 8 (Principle 16).
40. Id. at 12 (Principle 34).
41. However, membership in the Technical Committee, which is responsible for developing
the standards, is limited to a smaller group of members.
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jurisdictions,42 and consensus on the content of individual regulatory norms is low.
The few examples of progress toward convergence—where the relevant norms
have penetrated domestic regulatory systems—include international accounting
standards and prohibitions against insider trading.43
Administrative mechanisms within IOSCO seek to translate these principles
into national law.44 For instance, IOSCO’s Assessment Committee conducts
country reviews that provide national regulators, particularly in developing
economies, with road maps setting out areas for improvement. In addition, the
Financial Sector Assessment Program initiative of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank uses the Assessment Committee’s standards as benchmarks
when monitoring the compliance of member countries, further supporting the
penetration of the relevant norms into national legal systems.45 Nevertheless, some
commentators have concluded that “consensus-based international standards
coming out of IOSCO are too compromised, too ethereal to be of great use in the
complex and technical world of capital markets regulation.”46
* * *
As the account above indicates, securities law—the legal regime governing
transactions and participants in capital markets—has not been “authoritatively
order[ed]” by substantive norms that operate across national jurisdictions47 in more
than a very spotty sense. However, this is not to conclude that no transnational legal
order can be identified at work in this area. The domestic legislatures and agencies
responsible for producing securities laws work within, and are arguably confined by,
a framework of different transnational norms: those relating to the allocation of
jurisdictional authority within the international system. This framework imposes its
own form of transnational order on the regulation of global capital markets—an
order sourced in conflict of laws rules.48 It also brings its own set of normative

42. See Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission
Impossible? 4 (IMF Working Paper No. 09/168, 2009) (in a study of enforcement, concluding that many
countries have failed to implement “credible and effective” enforcement programs despite their general
commitment to the relevant IOSCO principles).
43. Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 231-33 (1998) (describing progress in these areas).
44.
See Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, The G10 Committees, and International
Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 869 (2009) (the goal of international standard setting of this
type is “not to adopt legally binding international standards. . ., but rather to influence domestic
regulatory law, practices and standards.”); see also Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 13 (identifying as
one attribute of a transnational legal order the engagement of “legal institutions within multiple nationstates, whether in the adoption, recognition, or enforcement of the [relevant] norms.”).
45.
See Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf
/IOSCOPD266.pdf. See also Alexander, supra note 44, at 877 (noting this form of benchmarking).
46. JORDAN, supra note 5, at 52.
47. See supra note 1 (defining the attributes of a “transnational legal order”).
48. See Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 63, 89 (2014) (“When regulators or market participants make a claim about the application
of one or another body of law to a given party or transaction, they are already making an implicit claim
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assumptions. First, fundamentally, securities-related activity in (or affecting) any
given market is best regulated by national law—whose scope is defined by
connecting factors such as the domicile of an investor or the location of a particular
transaction.49 Second, on the whole, competition among legal regimes (in offering
different forms of substantive regulation) is desirable, and divergence among
national norms will therefore be tolerated. Third, cooperation and coordination
mechanisms can be used to address whatever challenges arise as a result of
transnational market activity and to preserve the effectiveness of domestic
regulation in the face of those challenges. (In the following part, we will address
ways in which the global financial crisis complicated these assumptions.)
With respect to derivative securities in particular, this conflicts regime exists
alongside a strong private ordering regime shaped by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA). The ISDA is a trade association whose members
include not only derivatives dealers, but also end users (such as hedge funds) and
certain services providers (such as accounting firms).50 Over the past several
decades, the ISDA has been active in standard-setting, filling the gap created by
earlier legislative reforms that left many derivatives markets essentially
unregulated.51 Its Master Agreement and related schedules52 provide standardized
documentation for OTC derivatives transactions that has become the “market
norm,” governing the vast majority of transactions in those securities.53 The ISDA
also publishes supporting documents such as users’ guides and statements of best
practices that are intended to create a shared framework for the interpretation of
about what the scope of their national law should be. Whether they recognize it or not, they are making
a Conflicts argument.”).
49.
Id. at 89-90. This approach preserves the “inherent focus on domestic markets among
regulators[,] as they generally have as their primary responsibility the regulation of their domestic
territory and are explicitly required by national law to consider the impact of their rule-making,
supervision and enforcement on their domestic market as a priority, rather than consider any effect
outside their jurisdiction.” IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 43.
50. ISDA describes its membership as follows:
These members comprise of [sic] a broad range of derivatives market participants, including
corporations, investment managers, government and supranational entities, insurance
companies, energy and commodities firms, and international and regional banks. In addition
to market participants, members also include key components of the derivatives market
infrastructure, such as exchanges, intermediaries, clearing houses and repositories, as well as
law firms, accounting firms and other service providers.
About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited
Jul. 20, 2016). See also John Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown’ and ‘Partial Liftoff’: Post-Crisis Dispute Resolution in
the OTC Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1297, 1311 (2012) (providing a
brief description of the history and membership of the association).
51. GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 41 (2013). See also Sue R. Faerman et al., Understanding Interorganizational
Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation, 12 ORG. SCI. 372 (2001)
(providing an account of the role another trade group, the Derivatives Policy Group, played in shaping
financial regulation pre-global crisis).
52. For a description of the development of these instruments, see Gabriel V. Rauterberg &
Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA,
and the Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 20-23 (2013).
53. Id. at 13.
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resulting agreements. In addition to channeling the structure of private derivatives
transactions in this way, the standards articulated in the ISDA agreements have also
penetrated national legal systems—for instance, more than forty countries have
adopted netting legislation intended to secure predictable treatment for derivatives
under insolvency laws.54 The resulting system has been described as a “highly
successful transnational private regulatory regime.”55
III. DERIVATIVES REGULATION: A CASE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ORDERING
As many recent studies have concluded, various pathologies in the market for
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative securities contributed to the global financial
crisis.56 In particular, many large financial institutions had entered into credit default
swaps57 that were linked to collateralized debt obligations backed by home
mortgages. When the U.S. housing market collapsed, the resulting defaults on those
mortgages triggered massive payment obligations under the swaps.58 The swap
sellers were not able to honor their commitments to counterparties; some failed,
and others were rescued by government intervention intended to forestall the
further spread of defaults.59 Unsurprisingly, regulators in the aftermath of the crisis
called for comprehensive regulation of OTC derivatives.60
The following narrative examines the legislative and rulemaking processes that
have unfolded in the area of derivatives regulation. It describes the various actors
involved in these processes (including national agencies, international bodies, and
network organizations) and their progress toward the development and
implementation of particular substantive norms. The goal of this overview is not to

54. John Biggins & Colin Scott, Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime:
ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (2012)
(exploring ISDA’s strategy of “seek[ing] public incorporation of private norms within national
legislation”). See also Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 187 (2007)
(stating that “numerous statutes and regulations rely on certain provisions that are incorporated into
standard form OTC derivatives counterparty contracts, even though they do not explicitly reference
ISDA.”).
55. Biggins, supra note 50, at 1297. See also Riles, supra note 48, at 81 (stating that the norms and
practices of the ISDA and similar organizations “are now an integral part of the transnational legal
culture of the financial markets”).
56. See Biggins & Scott, supra note 54, at 321.
57. A swap is “a private agreement between two parties to exchange cash flows at certain times
according to a prearranged formula.” Partnoy, supra note 2, at 219. The formula may reference different
underlying indices, including interest rates (in the case of interest rate swaps) and currency exchange
rates (in the case of currency swaps). A credit default swap references “the credit or creditworthiness
of a borrower (debt issuer).” D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 2, at 483. It functions like insurance
against the non-payment of the underlying obligation: the seller of the swap agrees that if a default event
occurs with respect to the referenced obligation, the seller will pay the buyer. Id. at 483-84.
58. See D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 2, at 482-84 (describing this chain of events).
59.
Id. See also Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99
GEO. L.J. 257, 265 (2011).
60.
In a sense, the call was for re-regulation of these securities, as it was relatively recent
legislative reform that had removed the OTC markets from regulatory oversight. See Brooksley Born,
Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011).
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provide a comprehensive analysis of this episode, but rather to use it as a vehicle to
examine the characteristics of capital market regulation as a transnational legal
order.61 Ultimately, it aims to identify the political and economic aspects of
securities regulation that impede progress toward an effective transnational legal
order in that area.
A. Progress Toward a Transnational Approach
Early accounts following the crisis highlighted the fact that speculative trading
in OTC derivatives had created not just systemic risk but cross-border systemic
risk.62 As a result, the regulatory challenge was framed as a “global and international
collective action problem.”63
Many OTC derivatives markets are global, with the same products traded
in multiple jurisdictions and by multinational institutions. Given that these
markets function on a cross-border basis, it is important that there is
international cooperation and coordination to fulfil enforcement and
supervision responsibilities [and] minimise the potential for regulatory
arbitrage…64
The shared assumption, in other words, was that only adopting uniform rules
across national systems could prevent regulatory arbitrage and thereby contain the
systemic risks presented by OTC derivatives.65
The G20 emerged as the locus for developing new regulatory standards.66
Consensus at the general level—as to the fundamental goals of mitigating systemic
risk, improving market transparency, and protecting against market abuse—was

61. There are many excellent and detailed accounts of the role of derivatives in the financial
crisis and of the regulatory steps taken in its aftermath. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial
Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2013); David McCaffrey,
Private and Public Controls in the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, 1984-2015 (Oct. 10, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642216; Eric Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization? The
Post-Crisis Governance of Global OTC Derivatives, in TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER
THE CRISIS 132 (Tony Porter ed. 2014); MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51.
62. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (providing a definition of
systemic risk in general, and, at Part III, discussing cross-border risk); Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of
the International Financial Architecture After the Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81, 87 (2009)
(describing the crisis as “a perfect illustration of systemic risk at the international level—the
contamination of other markets, sectors, or jurisdictions following defaults in a given domestic
economy”). See also Tech. Comm., Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, INT’L ORG. OF
SEC. COMM’NS (2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf.
63. MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51, at 53.
64.
Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, FIN. STABILITY BD. 7 (2010),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf [hereinafter Implementing Market Reforms].
65.
See id. at 2 (“Given the global nature of the OTC derivatives markets, continued
international coordination in dealing with ongoing implementation of the G20 commitments is critical.
Work should be taken forward by the relevant standard setters and authorities to achieve international
consistency.”).
66. The G20 is the forum in which finance ministers from the world’s leading economies meet
to consider matters of economic and monetary policy. See generally Brummer, Post-American Securities
Regulation, supra note 32, at 357-58 (providing a brief description and history of the group).
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easy to reach.67 And at a meeting held in Pittsburgh at the end of 2009, the leaders
of the G20 agreed to three core regulatory commitments: (1) all standardized OTC
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms,
where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the
latest;68 (2) OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories; and
(3) non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements.69
The task of coordinating efforts to implement these core commitments fell
primarily to the Financial Stability Board (FSB).70 This organization, founded in
1999 but whose operations expanded following the 2008 financial crisis,71 has been
described as a “‘network of networks’ where standard setters, financial ministries,
and central banks all interact[.]”72 The FSB articulates its composition and mission
in the following terms:
The FSB has a unique composition among international bodies, because it
brings together senior policy makers from ministries of finance, central
banks, and supervisory and regulatory authorities, for the G20 countries,
plus four other key financial centres – Hong Kong, Singapore, Spain and
Switzerland. In addition, it includes international bodies, including
standard-setters and regional bodies like the European Central Bank and
European Commission. This means it has all the main players who set
financial stability policies across different sectors of the financial system
are [sic] at one table. So when policies are agreed, they also have the
authority to carry it out.
Policies agreed by the FSB are not legally binding, nor are they intended to
replace the normal national and regional regulatory process. Instead, the
FSB acts as a coordinating body, to drive forward the policy agenda to
strengthen financial stability. It operates by moral suasion and peer
pressure, to set internationally agreed policies and minimum standards that
its members commit to implement at national level [sic].73

67. Elisse Walter, Address at the American Bar Association Spring Meeting, Washington D.C.:
Regulation of Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Activities: Finding the Middle Ground (Apr. 6, 2013).
68. This commitment therefore ensured that standard margin requirements would be in place
for these securities, reducing counterparty risk.
69. Implementing Market Reforms, supra note 64, at 8; see also Coffee, supra note 61, at 1273; Sean
J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation,
98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (2014) (providing accounts of this meeting).
70.
See generally Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International
Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157 (2013) (describing the FSB and its role in derivatives reform).
71. JORDAN, supra note 5, at 48 (discussing the history of the FSB as successor organization to
the Financial Stability Forum, which emerged following the Asian financial crisis).
72. Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, supra note 32, at 359. See also Gadinis, supra note
70, at 163 (describing the FSB as “an umbrella organization that comprises the diverse players active in
international financial policymaking – international institutions, regulatory networks, private
associations, and domestic regulators” as well as representatives from the G20 governments).
73. What We Do, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (last visited Jul.
20, 2016). See also Griffith, supra note 69, at 1366; Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence
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The FSB is used both to initiate policymaking, through special committees and
with the support of existing networks under its umbrella, and also to coordinate
domestic implementation of transnational standards.74 Both of these functions
came into play in the area of derivatives regulation; a working group was created to
develop regulatory recommendations,75 after which a formal review mechanism was
put in place to ensure the implementation of those recommendations in FSB
member states.76
Progress on the national level toward implementing specific legislation and
rules has been slow, and to date reflects only moderate international consensus.
Some major markets have adopted (or are in the process of adopting)
comprehensive regulatory schemes governing transactions in over-the-counter
derivatives. In the European Union, for example, the Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR) adopted in 2012 introduced rules governing central
counterparties, and imposed certain clearing and reporting obligations for
transactions in OTC derivatives.77 A number of subsequent regulations issued
within the EMIR framework set forth implementing rules and standards.78 In 2014,
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive followed, laying out the framework
within which member states will regulate trading venues, including those for
derivatives.79 In the United States, similarly, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act80
introduced provisions consistent with the G20 commitments.81 The Act also
required the promulgation of both “entity-level” regulations applicable to swaps
dealers (for instance, capital adequacy and reporting requirements) and
“transaction-level” regulations applicable to the transactions they conduct (for
instance, margin requirements and requirements relating to the confirmation,
and Limits of the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at
239-40 (discussing the composition and objectives of the FSB).
74. See Gadinis, supra note 70, at 169 (describing these functions).
75. See Part III.B.1 infra for further discussion of this working group.
76. See Gadinis, supra note 70, at 174-75 (outlining the peer review-based process put in place
by the FSB).
77. Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July, 2012 on
OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1.
78.
See, e.g., Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 of 19 December 2012
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with
regard to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, the clearing obligation, the
public register, access to a trading venue, non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques
for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a CCP, 2013 O.J. (L 52/11); Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on capital
requirements for central counterparties, 2013 O.J. (L 52/37). For an overview of this implementing
legislation, see JONES DAY, THE EUROPEAN MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION AND
TRANSPARENCY IN THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET (2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files
/upload/EMIR_and_Transparency.pdf.
79. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
markets in financial instruments, 173 OJ L 349 (2014).
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
81. See McCaffrey, supra note 61, at 37.
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clearing and documentation of swaps). Pursuant to these dictates, both the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) promulgated initial rules regulating markets in OTC
derivatives.82 For instance, the CFTC issued rules requiring mandatory clearing for
most interest rate swaps and for many credit default swaps.83 Both Commissions
adopted margin and collateral requirements applicable to derivatives
clearinghouses.84 For swaps that are not cleared through a derivatives clearing
organization (and are therefore not subject to that organization’s margin
requirements), both Commissions established bilateral margin requirements.85
Progress has been slower in some other systems, even within the group of FSB
member states.86 A report issued by the FSB in 2015, for instance, notes that most
had yet to develop margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.87
Outside that group, the picture is cloudier; some countries are simply on a slower
time schedule, but others appear disinterested in adopting comprehensive
regulations.88 Moreover, the reforms vary in substance across jurisdictions—on
issues such as exemptions from regulation for certain swaps dealers, specific
reporting requirements, and the procedural aspects of margin requirements.89 One
recent study of clearinghouses, for example, concludes that “E.U. and U.S.
legislators, while giving effect to the internationally agreed consensus, differ on
granular questions concerning the regulation of derivatives clearinghouses”90—
questions including matters such as margin requirements, collateral requirements,
and investment policy requirements.91 In other words, the high-level regulatory
commitments agreed upon at the transnational level are not settling uniformly in
national legal systems.92

82. For a full description of this rulemaking, see Coffee, supra note 61, at 1275-77.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 50.4.
84. See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg.
69, 334, 69, 334-45 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140) (CFTC requirements);
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed.
Reg. 14,472, 14,479 (Mar. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (SEC requirements).
85. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,
81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 23, 140).
86.
Useful information regarding progress in different systems toward the adoption of
derivatives regulations can be found on the website of the Financial Stability Board, where ten progress
reports have been posted.
87. OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, Tenth Progress Report on Implementation, FIN. STABILITY BD.
(2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/OTC-Derivatives-10th-Progress-Report.pdf.
88. See Griffith, supra note 69, at 1322-23.
89. See Heikki Marjosola, Regulate Thy Neighbor: Competition and Conflict in the Cross-Border Regulatory
Space for OTC Derivatives 10 (EUI Working Paper No. 2016/01, 2016), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2733138 (outlining some of these differences).
90.
Yesha Yadav & Dermot Turing, The Extra-Territorial Regulation of Clearinghouses, 2 J. FIN.
REG. 21, 23 (2016).
91. Id. at 34-45 (outlining differences between the two regimes).
92. See Marjosola, supra note 89, at 9 (concluding that “[m]uch of the consensus that has been
reached under the G20 umbrella has been lost in implementation, where soft principles and policy goals
have been translated into hard rules.”).
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More critically, cross-border transactions (which, as noted above, account for
the vast majority of derivatives trading)93 have become more complicated as a result
of differences in the pace and substance of national reform efforts.94 In a 2015
report, the ISDA observed the consequence of uncertainty regarding applicable law:
Rather than being subject to multiple, potentially inconsistent
requirements, derivatives users are increasingly choosing to trade with
counterparties in their own jurisdictions. The result is a fragmentation of
liquidity pools along geographic lines, which reduces choice, increases
costs, and will make it more challenging for end users to enter into or
unwind large transactions, particularly in stressed markets.95
In this respect, the process has not yielded the sort of uniform and collective
response desired.
The following section investigates more closely some of the challenges that
have impeded transnational reform in derivatives regulation.
B. Obstacles to the Formation of a TLO
1.

Issue alignment

In the United States, Dodd-Frank allocated regulatory authority over swap
agreements to both the Securities and Exchange Commission (as to “security-based
swaps”96) and the Commodity Futures Trade Commission (as to all other swaps).97
Consistent with the international orientation described above, it required the
agencies not only to work in collaboration with each other, but also to consult with
foreign regulators in establishing consistent international standards.98 However, the
agencies worked independently in developing rules to satisfy these requirements.
They proceeded on different time schedules and arrived at different substantive
regulations.99 In particular, the SEC adopted a somewhat less aggressive approach

93. See supra note 12.
94. See FSB Tenth Progress Report at 13 (“[U]nevenness in the pace of implementation of reforms,
as well as inconsistencies or gaps in the application of requirements to cross-border transactions, can
result in duplicative or overlapping requirements or lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.”
95. Briefing Notes, The Dodd Frank Act: Five Years On, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N 8
(2015), http://www2.isda.org/dodd-frank/ (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
96. “Security-based swap” is defined as any agreement, contract, or transaction that is a swap
based on a narrow-based security index, a single security or loan, or event relating to the issuer of either.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act amended the securities laws to bring securitybased swaps within the definition of “security.” Dodd-Frank Act § 761(a). The Dodd-Frank Act also
gave the SEC anti-fraud enforcement authority over “security-based swap agreements.” Dodd-Frank
Act § 712(d).
97. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 7 U.S.C. § 1a (amending CEA section defining swaps).
98.
Section 752(a). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS:
REGULATORS’ ANALYTICAL AND COORDINATION EFFORTS 15 (2014) (explaining that the purpose
of this requirement was to enhance coordination in arriving at “consistent international standards
regarding the regulation of swaps, security-based swaps, swap entities, and security-based swap
entities”).
99. For an exhaustive treatment of interagency coordination issues, see id. at 35-41.

2016]

Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory Conflict

107

than the CFTC regarding the extraterritorial reach of its rules.100 Conflict internal
to the domestic regime therefore slowed progress and (as discussed further below)
interfered with international negotiations.
Another alignment issue arose due to the assignment of the problem at the
international level. Both before and immediately following the financial crisis,
international network organizations were created that were dedicated to the issue of
OTC derivatives regulation. They included the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group
(ODSG), chaired by the New York Fed,101 and the OTC Derivatives Regulators’
Forum (ODRF), created in 2009 “to provide authorities interested in OTC
derivatives markets and their supporting infrastructures with a means to cooperate,
exchange views, and share information on OTC derivatives central counterparties
(CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs).”102 However, as described above, following
the G20’s adoption of core commitments regarding derivatives trading, the task of
coordinating implementation fell to the FSB. This move took the issue out of the
hands of the derivatives networks, as described by the ODRF itself:
[S]ince its formation the environment in which the ODRF has been
operating has changed significantly: the international standard setting
bodies have created risk management standards for infrastructures serving
the OTC derivatives markets; further, domestic mandatory clearing and
reporting rules have resulted in the increased use of these infrastructures
to meet the G20 objectives. Authorities participating in the ODRF have
noted that several of the gaps and concerns the forum was initially formed
to address are now more appropriately handled by these standard setting
bodies and domestic authorities.103
As noted above, the FSB operates as a meta-network, coordinating
participants from multiple private and public sectors. In launching its work, the FSB
called for the formation of a working group to help develop recommendations on
the implementation of the core commitments regarding OTC derivatives. It
included representatives of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems,
IOSCO, and the European Commission.104 In subsequent meetings, additional
100. See infra. The CFTC’s approach, enshrined in its proposed guidance released on June 29,
2012, was widely criticized as overly aggressive in asserting the Commission’s authority to apply its rules
to swap participants worldwide whose activities touched the United States. See Regulator of the World,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2013.
101.
This group, comprising “representatives of major OTC derivatives market participants
and their domestic and international supervisors,” was formed in 2005. The last documents posted on
its website date to 2011. See OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html#tabs-1 (last visited
Jul. 20, 2016).
102. See OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ F., http://www.otcdrf.org/index.htm (last visited
Jul. 20, 2016).
103.
Id. The group subsequently revised its mandate to focus on information sharing and
cooperation. See Revised Framework for Information Sharing and Cooperation Among OTC Derivatives Regulators,
OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ F. (2014), http://www.otcdrf.org/documents/odrf
_framework_may2014.pdf.
104. Implementing Market Reforms, supra note 64, at iii.
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organizations were brought into the implementation process: for instance, in a 2011
meeting, the G20 requested the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
IOSCO, “together with other relevant organizations,” to work on developing
standards on margin requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives.105
As this account demonstrates, the issue of regulating OTC derivative securities
was wrapped into much broader discussions regarding financial regulation generally.
Given the proliferation of international institutions at that point engaged in various
financial sectors,106 many different entities had their hands on the issue of
derivatives regulation, with the Financial Stability Board playing only a loose
coordinating role. The transnational entities whose mandates aligned most closely
with the specific question of derivatives regulation were not in control of the
process.107
2.

The return of unilateralism

Because rulemaking within the G20 framework proceeded at the national level,
it was clear from the outset that significant divergence might remain in the scope
and content of regulation (if for no other reason, simply because the pace of
legislative reform would differ). In light of this, both the United States and the
European Union, while working to implement their own rules complying with the
G20 commitments, nevertheless preserved the right to apply domestic law
extraterritorially if they felt that doing so was necessary to protect the integrity of
their markets.108 Each threatened to bar foreign dealers from participating in local
swaps markets if it concluded that those dealers were not sufficiently regulated by
their home country. For instance, Section 715 of Dodd-Frank provided that entities
could be prohibited from participating in the U.S. swaps markets if they were
domiciled in nations whose own regulation was deemed inadequate to protect “the
105.
G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building Our Common Future: Renewed
Collective Action for the Benefit of All ¶ 24 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011cannes-declaration-111104-en.html.
106. See Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 73, at 239 (noting that at that point in time
“the international institutional landscape was rapidly becoming quite cluttered.”).
107.
This is not to say that sector-specific networks had no input—the OTC Derivatives
Regulators Group, for instance, comprising the principals of regulatory authorities in Australia, Brazil,
the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Ontario, Quebec, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United
States, advise G20 leaders and the FSB on cross-border implementation issues. See OTC DERIVATIVES
REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) TO G20
LEADERS ON CROSS-BORDER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups
/public/@internationalaffairs/documents/file/odrgreportg20_111.pdf;
OTC
DERIVATIVES
REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT ON AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS TO RESOLVING CROSS-BORDER
CONFLICTS, INCONSISTENCIES, GAPS AND DUPLICATIVE REQUIREMENTS (2013),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. However,
the transnational process was located within the broader FSB working group. Helleiner notes another
change in the constitution of contributors to these networks: “[T]he unprecedented politicization of
OTC derivatives in the wake of the crisis—particularly within the USA and Europe—has drawn many
domestic groups into the policymaking process beyond those involved in the FSB’s elite
transgovernmental networks.” Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization?, supra note 61, at 143.
108. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1263-64 (focusing on this extraterritoriality problem).
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stability of the United States financial system.”109 The European Market
Infrastructure Regulation adopted a similar approach: in Article 25, for instance, it
reserved the right to bar foreign CCPs from providing clearing services within the
European Union if they were not subject to “effective supervision and
enforcement” in their home jurisdiction.110 In this sense, the respective countries
used extraterritorial regulation as a backstop to efforts to harmonize regulation of
the derivatives markets.111
The extent to which domestic laws would apply extraterritorially generated a
significant dispute between the United States and the European Union. In mid2012, the CFTC issued proposed guidance on this point, which indicated an
aggressive approach toward the extraterritorial application of U.S. regulations.112
Under this guidance, U.S. rules would have been applied to several categories of
transactions substantially connected with foreign markets—including, for example,
transactions between foreign affiliates of a U.S. person and foreign parties.113 The
guidance offered limited relief only for non-U.S. registered swap dealers or major
swap participants, who would be exempt from U.S. regulation if they complied with
foreign regulatory requirements that the CFTC deemed comparable. The CFTC’s
position was opposed by the European Union, which in spring 2013, along with the
finance ministers of several other countries, complained to the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury that it did not defer sufficiently to European rules and would lead to a
fragmentation of the derivatives market.114
Following additional discussions, the CFTC and the EU in summer 2013
issued a joint statement reaffirming their mutual commitment to the general
approach of substituted compliance, stating that “[j]urisdictions and regulators
should be able to defer to each other when it is justified by the quality of their
respective regulation and enforcement regimes.”115 And the CFTC subsequently
109.
15 U.S.C. § 8304 (2012). Section 722(d) further provided that U.S. law would apply to
foreign swap activities that had “a direct and significant connection” with activities in U.S. commerce,
or that were deemed evasive of U.S. law. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i).
110. EMIR Article 25. The European regulators likewise provided that EU law would apply to
certain foreign swap activities that were deemed to have a “direct, substantial and foreseeable effect
within the Union,” or that were deemed evasive of European regulations. Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No 285/2014 of 13 February 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on direct,
substantial and foreseeable effect of contracts within the Union and to prevent the evasion of rules and
obligations, 2014 O.J. (L 85/1).
111. See Griffith, supra note 69, at 1325, 1329-30.
112. Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 12, 2012). See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1277-78 (describing the proposed
guidance).
113. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1278 (“the guidance would have exempted transactions only
between a non-U.S. swap entity and a non-U.S. counterparty that was not an affiliate of a U.S. person.”).
114. Ministerial-level Joint Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency and nine foreign authorities on
Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Reform to Jacob J. Lew, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2013/20130419.html.
115.
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Cross-Border Regulation of
Swaps/Derivatives, Discussions between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
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modified its position, expanding the category of transactions eligible for exemption
on the basis of compliance with comparable foreign requirements.116 It also issued
a no-action letter concluding that the European Union’s risk mitigation rules were
“essentially identical” to the CFTC’s own (and thus that market participants
complying with those rules were conclusively in compliance with U.S. regulation).117
Subsequent action by the CFTC, however, appeared again to frustrate
expectations regarding the possible scope of extraterritorial regulation. At the end
of 2013, the CFTC issued another advisory that approved the entity-level
regulations of several other regimes as comparable to U.S. regulation, but approved
only a very limited number of transaction-level regulations.118 The result was that
many transactions would remain subject to the CFTC’s transaction-level
requirements, which include the clearing requirement, the trade execution mandate
and real-time public reporting obligations.
A spokesman for European Commissioner Barnier was “surprised” by the
CFTC advisory, stating that it “seem[s] to us to go against both the letter and spirit
of the path forward agreement. … [The advisory is] another step away from the
kind of inter-operable global system that we want to build.” One commentator
described the resulting risk in the following way:
[T]he global swaps market was splitting into two segments—a U.S. market
governed by the CFTC’s rules and participants elsewhere trying to avoid
the CFTC’s rules. This was harmful given the extent to which economic
activity had to be coordinated across national borders. Regulators in other
nations argued that the CFTC was violating norms of global regulatory
cooperation given how aggressively it was claiming jurisdiction over
activities in other nations on the grounds that they affected the United
States.119
This dispute was eventually resolved, as the CFTC and European regulators
came to terms on issues including the regulation of each other’s clearinghouses and
certain margin requirements for uncleared swaps.120 However, it was resolved
through bilateral negotiations between the regulators involved, and not by means
of any mediation through the networking organizations.121 The dispute therefore

European Union – A Path Forward, (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases
/pr6640-13.
116.
Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292 (Jul. 26, 2013).
117. Letter from Div. of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n on No-Action Relief for Registered Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants from
Certain Requirements (Jul. 11, 2013) (Letter No. 13-45).
118.
Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Approves
Comparability Determinations for Six Jurisdictions for Substituted Compliance Purposes (Dec. 20,
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6802-13.
119. McCaffrey, supra note 61, at 46.
120. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
121. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1264 (noting that “[t]hroughout this bruising and hard-nosed
negotiation process, the major international networking institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, the
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had the consequence of pulling negotiation regarding substantive norms out of the
transnational networks.
3.

Diagnostic issues and the political economy of capital markets

As discussed above, the framing of the problems posed by OTC trading in
derivative securities rested in part on two critical assumptions. The first was that the
earlier deregulation of those markets had enabled an explosion in the speculative,
socially non-beneficial use of derivatives, which in turn contributed to the financial
crisis.122 The second was that the systemic risk posed by the OTC markets was not
only cross-border but also truly global in nature, and thus could be contained only
through concerted global action.123 This framing engendered expectations that the
incentives were in place to advance the spread of transnational norms related to the
regulation of derivatives trading.124 The regulatory process that has unfolded since
the crisis, however, has revealed confrontations between these assumptions and the
political economy of the global capital markets.125
On the first point, it is important to emphasize that trading in OTC derivatives
is not per se irrational or inefficient. Indeed, the primary purpose of derivatives is
to permit entities engaged in productive economic activity to manage the financial
risks that those activities create.126 OTC derivatives are particularly useful in this
regard, as they can be customized in order to address the specific hedging or other
needs of the counterparties.127 As rulemaking proceeded, the initial and somewhat
rough framing of the issue (that unregulated trading in OTC derivatives creates
unacceptable levels of systemic risk) gave way to debates over exactly how the risks
created by abusive or purely speculative OTC trading could be contained without
eliminating the beneficial aspects of that market. These debates inevitably involved
a clash between proponents of greater regulatory intervention and market
participants who resisted the characterization of OTC derivatives as inherently

Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the Financial Stability Board—remained largely on the sidelines, with
the real bargaining being between U.S. regulators and an EU commissioner.”).
122. See generally Born, supra note 60.
123. Supra note 63 and accompanying text.
124. Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, supra note 32, at 331 (“[O]nly where securities
regulation touches upon ‘systemic risks. . .’ will regulators be sufficiently incentivized to cooperate and
will networks potentially be capable of realizing significant regulatory coordination.”).
125. See JORDAN, supra note 5, at 52.
126. MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51, at 43. Frank Partnoy outlines the argument as follows:
Derivatives, the argument goes, allow corporations, governments, financial firms, and others
to: (1) reduce or hedge exposure to fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange rates,
equity and commodity prices, and other financial variables; (2) speculate in a less costly and
more efficient manner; and (3) capture arbitrage opportunities and thus reduce funding and
other financial costs.
Partnoy, supra note 2, at 213.
127. Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 677, 735 (2002); see also Gina-Gail Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of
Hedging with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 828 (2014).
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dangerous.128 It was to be expected that different countries would strike the balance
between these interests differently, depending in part on the strength of local
lobbies on behalf of market participants.129
On the second point, the framing of the problem as a shared global concern
ignored the political economy of individual capital markets. As discussed above,
countries continue to maintain different regulatory philosophies, and have different
outcome preferences, with some preferring weak regulation.130 With respect to
derivatives regulation in particular, regulatory competition may benefit certain
countries. As noted above, banks are free to move their derivatives operations to
whatever country offers the most hospitable regulatory regime, therefore creating
an incentive for some host countries to compete by adopting less restrictive
requirements.131 If those countries do not face significant risk from an eventual
market collapse, they would see little benefit in adopting more restrictive rules. And,
indeed, even clearly systemic risks, such as those created by the global OTC
derivatives markets, do not in fact affect all markets equally. The costs of a systemic
risk crisis would fall unevenly on different countries, posing a greater risk to the
major markets.132 Thus, it is those markets, and those alone, that have the incentive
to invest in tightening their regulations.133 In this light, the outcome of regulatory
efforts to date is consistent with the theory of “minilateralism”: the countries
“whose markets are relevant (or ‘systemically important’) to the regulatory task at
hand” are the ones that will be involved in the formation of regulatory norms.134
IV. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS IN THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES
MARKETS
The problem of systemic risk created by OTC derivatives trading (particularly
as considered against the backdrop of a global financial crisis) presented an
unusually strong case for the development of a regulatory order based on formalized

128. At stake here was the cost of the new regulations for participants in the OTC derivatives
markets and the concern of participants in heavily regulated markets that they would be at a competitive
disadvantage to participants in less regulated markets.
129. See generally Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 450 (2008) (noting that financial firms may benefit from cross-border regulatory
differences, and stating that their positions are likely to be “coherently articulated, actively pursued
through lobbying, and ultimately reflected in government policy.”).
130. See Brummer, International Financial Law, supra note 59, at 270.
131. Griffith, supra note 69, at 1293. See also Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization?, supra
note 61, at 143 (discussing the possibility that Asian countries may seek to minimize regulatory burdens
in order to avoid undermining their own growing derivatives markets).
132. Swap dealers, for instance, are overwhelmingly located in the United States, the European
Union, and a small number of additional markets.
133. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1268; Brummer, International Financial Law, supra note 59, at
270 (recognizing this problem of asymmetric benefit).
134.
CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 85 (2014). See also Coffee,
supra note 61, at 1268 (advocating a “minilateral” solution rather than one that aims to achieve global
harmonization of the relevant rules).
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transnational legal norms. The obstacles that impeded the development of such an
order are even less likely to be surmounted in areas where the particular regulatory
challenge is less clearly global and systemic. Indeed, a recent IOSCO consultation
report expressed skepticism regarding the possibility of harmonization in
international securities regulation.135 That report surveyed a number of methods
that regulatory systems use in applying their rules to global financial activity,
including national treatment, “passporting,” and various forms of recognition.136
The report concluded:
From the information and analysis derived from consultation so far, no
consensus exists on the question of whether cross-border regulation of the
securities markets would best be achieved by full coordination and total
harmonization of cross-border rules among jurisdictions, even if those
goals were somehow achievable. The responses, however, make clear that
such a result is not achievable in the current context, noting the absence of
any supranational institution with legal authority to impose harmonized
regulations from the top down.137
It went on to suggest a conscious turn toward a more institutionalized
conflicts-type order—one supported by clearer rules on the allocation of
jurisdiction among national regulators.
Some respondents and commenters also suggested that IOSCO could
propose a “conflict of regulations” framework, which would be used to
determine the regulation that applies and the regulator which has
jurisdiction in a specific cross-border situation. In their view, such a
framework may increase efficiency and prevent duplication of supervisory
work with regard to reporting. These responses also noted that IOSCO
could propose a granular set of rules determining the regulation that applies
with regard to the reporting duties and designate the regulator to which the
concerned market participant has reporting duties.138
The most recent wave of rulemaking, which incorporates a “substituted
compliance” (or “mutual recognition”) approach, takes steps in this direction. The
substituted compliance approach was first developed in a 2007 article co-authored
by the director and the general counsel of the SEC’s Office of International
Affairs.139 In the original article, the authors applied this approach to the question
of exchange and broker-dealer regulation. They argued that
instead of being subject to direct SEC supervision and U.S. federal
securities regulations and rules, foreign stock exchanges and broker-dealers

135.
BD. OF INT’ ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, IOSCO TASK FORCE ON CROSS-BORDER
REGULATION, CONSULTATION REPORT (2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf
/IOSCOPD466.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Consultation Report].
136. Id. at 8.
137. Id. at 44.
138. Id. at 45-46.
139. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A
New International Framework, 48 HARV. J. INT’L L. 31 (2007).
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would apply for an exemption from SEC registration based on their
compliance with substantively comparable foreign securities regulations
and laws and supervision by a foreign securities regulator with oversight
powers and a regulatory and enforcement philosophy substantively similar
to the SEC’s.140
This model takes for granted that different countries will adopt different
regulatory frameworks (in other words, it does not presuppose a move toward
eventual unification of the rules governing securities markets). It provides instead
that a country can choose to recognize another regime as substantively equivalent
to its own.
Recent rulemaking explicitly adopts this substituted compliance model.141 In
early 2016, for instance, the CFTC and the European Union approved a substituted
compliance framework for the regulation of central counterparties (CCPs).142 Under
this framework, the European Commission agreed to issue an equivalence
determination permitting U.S.-registered CCPs to provide clearing services within
the European Union as long as they meet applicable U.S. requirements.143 Similarly,
the CFTC agreed to issue a determination concluding that the requirements set
forth in the European EMIR were comparable to U.S. requirements, and that EUregistered CCPs complying with EMIR would be deemed in compliance with U.S.
law. The SEC too has adopted rules incorporating a substituted compliance
approach—for example, in connection with reporting requirements applicable to
security-based swaps.144
This model is compatible with the conflict-of-laws framework. Each national
regulator continues to apply its own domestic law to foreign entities whose
operations affect its markets, and to particular transactions involving domestic
interests. It is domestic law, in the form of an equivalence or comparability
determination, that dictates whether compliance with a foreign regime will be
accepted as sufficient. It may be that this approach promotes the ultimate
harmonization of substantive rules; indeed, the regulators presented this framework

140. Id. at 32.
141. See Marjosola, supra note 89, at 12-14 (discussing the adoption of a substituted compliance
approach in both the European Union and the United States).
142. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. P 33644 (C.C.H.), The United States Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the European Commission: Common Approach for Transatlantic CCPs (February
10, 2016).
143.
See the provisional text of the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) on the
equivalence of the regulatory framework of the United States of America for central counterparties that
are authorised and supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the requirements of
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.070.01.0032.01.ENG
&toc=OJ:L:2016:070:TOC. (Mar. 15, 2016).
144. Sec. Exch. Rel. No. 34-74244 (Feb. 11, 2015), Regulation SBSR—Reporting and
Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information. Rule 908(c) of this Regulation allows foreign
entities to request a determination that the regulatory reporting and public dissemination requirements
imposed by their home regulator are comparable to those of the United States.

2016]

Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory Conflict

115

as “an important step forward for global regulatory convergence.”145 But that is not
inevitable. In a release addressing certain security-based swaps, the Securities and
Exchange Commission noted that
[i]n practice, however, we recognize that there will be limits to the
availability of substituted compliance. For example, it is possible that
substituted compliance may be permitted with regard to some
requirements and not others with respect to a particular jurisdiction. For
certain jurisdictions, moreover, substituted compliance may not be
available with respect to any requirements depending on our assessment of
the comparability of the relevant foreign requirements, as well as the
availability of supervisory and enforcement arrangements among the
Commission and relevant foreign financial regulatory authorities.146
As Annelise Riles has pointed out, the benefit of a more robust conflict-oflaws based approach is that it can go beyond generalized rules to encompass
expansive and sensitive analysis, issue by issue and party by party, of the most critical
questions regarding the choice to exercise regulatory power: “What other regulatory
authority is involved? How different are the rules and principles of the two possible
authorities? Who are the parties? What is the nature of the transaction? What state
and private interests are implicated?”147 In the context of substituted compliance,
accordingly, the granularity of the equivalence determinations is critical.148 In this
connection, it is important to note that some market participants and policymakers
have resisted this form of “issue by issue” analysis, advocating instead for broad,
categorical equivalence determinations in a number of areas.149 In a dissenting
statement criticizing the CFTC’s decision to pursue granular equivalence
determinations regarding certain margin requirements, for instance, Commissioner
Giancarlo stated that “instead of recognizing and building upon … the CFTC’s own
history of using a principles-based, holistic approach to comparability
determinations, the Commission is adopting a set of preconditions to substituted
compliance that is overly complex, unduly narrow and operationally impractical.”
He went on to criticize the applicable rule for requiring an “element-by-element”
comparison of CFTC and foreign margin requirements, and a “fact-specific inquiry

145. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n and Eur. Comm’n: Common
Approach for Transatlantic CCPs (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases
/cftc_euapproach021016.
146. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-77104, Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected With a NonU.S. Person’s Dealing Activity, at 33. (Feb. 10, 2016).
147. Riles, supra note 48, at 101.
148.
As Riles notes, a conflicts approach “generates not blanket rules, but issue-by-issue
determinations of scope.” Id. at 101.
149.
The recent release adopting rules governing margin requirements for uncleared swaps
summarized the comments of market participants to this effect. Margin Requirements for Uncleared
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin
Requirements, 17 C.F.R. Part 23, 2016 WL 3038148, at 34828-29.
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of each legal and regulatory provision,” rather than simply “assessing a foreign
authority’s margin regime as a whole.”150
* * *
It is a temptation in studying transnational legal orders to think of them as
evolutionary—as moving from the primitive stages of isolationism and unilateralism
to an end state of unification.151 They have no such clear teleology. The political
economy of particular markets may mean it is not possible (or, indeed, desirable) to
work toward a top-down type of TLO where the norms are generated within
transnational networks or supranational institutions and then diffused—or where
uniform regulatory norms are developed at all. Rather, systems that continue to
tolerate regulatory divergence, and that rely on tools such as conflicts methodology
to manage that divergence, may persist in certain sectors.

150. Id. at 34853-54.
151. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 48, at 69 (describing this view as “standard and almost universally
shared”); Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the Harmonization and
Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 590 (2010) (advocating an
“evolutionary process” leading to the development of a harmonized, centralized regulatory order).

